Last week, when the State Department dropped its 23-year-old ban on Americans traveling to Libya in response to the Libyan government's actions over the past 60 days, the American people and the world got a clear indication of how well American foreign policy is working. While it has come under fire ÷ literally and figuratively ÷ from many directions, Bush's foreign policy finally has a significant success that can be used to undercut the criticism.
Cracking Libya is no small achievement. Since 1969, the state has been a solid mix of socialist and Islamic, under the total control of Col. Moammar Gadhafi. Since the late 1970s, it has been listed by the U.S. government as a state sponsor of terrorism, and through the 1980s, the tumult between Libya and the United States intensified as a result of several incidents. Libya fired on American jets training over international waters in 1981, and the government was linked to two major terrorist attacks. The first was on a disco popular with U.S. troops stationed in West Germany in 1986, and the second was the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988.
The disco bombing elicited an American attack on Libyan targets, economic sanctions and the severing of diplomatic relations, and the second attack put Gadhafi's regime in the company of a few choice pariahs with the passage of U.N. economic sanctions in 1992.
For years, he was suspected of seeking weapons of mass destruction ÷ whether through domestic production or by import. And the negotiations between American and Libyan parties, search teams' scouring of the large North African state and Libya's plans to destroy thousands of chemical weapon shells under international supervision confirm that Libya was aspiring to amass them, an offense not just to the United States but to the entire world.
Thanks to the efforts of the Bush administration, this threat has been defused, and we can learn a couple of good lessons from the incident.
First, there are ways to effect change diplomatically that are effective, but only if there is some sort of openness on the other side. Military action against Libya didn't solve the problem ÷ economic sanctions from the United Nations for only seven years started to make Gadhafi reconsider his position and take steps to move forward within the global framework. Iraq was in a similar position for more than 10 years, and look how effective sanctions were in that case.
Beyond the United Nations, the United States took economic action of its own through the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, which penalized foreign companies that significantly invested in Libya. If given the choice between an opportunity to succeed in the world's largest economy or Libya, companies presumably would choose to deal in the American economy, which robs Libya of a large amount of foreign investment.
The second lesson is that being passive is not always the best strategy because making examples of rogue states can serve two beneficial purposes. The practice not only eliminates the problem government, but it puts those countries that are actually doing something to warrant worry on alert as well. As we see in the case of Libya, that can yield real results ÷ the Iraqi war made Gadhafi rethink his positions, stop playing games with the international community and come to the negotiating table.
The opening of a relationship with Libya holds great potential for both the Libyan people and the United States. While the barriers to investment are still in place, they are not likely to be up for very much longer. When they fall, American companies will be there to benefit from a newly open market, and the Libyans will be exposed to a flood of Westerners and their ideas. In fact, as tourism is likely to pick up, it seems virtually inevitable that there will be a loosening of restrictions on things like alcohol and "immodest" dress in order to draw more people in.
While Gadhafi allowed diplomatic means to bring peaceful change and disarmament, the Bush administration deserves a great deal of credit for its overall handling of Libya and the result of the negotiations. Like the League of Nations, and in most cases the United Nations, it once again shows not only the value but also the necessity of actual force in backing diplomatic pressure.
Aaron Okin is a regional development and political science junior. He can be reached at letters@wildcat.arizona.edu.