Editorās note: This is the second in a two-part series explaining the history and present state of the conflict in the Middle East. Because of the recent escalation of violence in the region, the Wildcat has asked Charles D. Smith, professor of near-Eastern studies, to write about the conflict.

WHAT WERE THE OUTSTANDING POLITICAL ISSUES IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

The major questions centered on United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, issued in November 1967, that called for negotiations to lead to peace agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The terms of SCR 242 focused on the lands occupied by Israel in the 1967 War, and referred to the Palestinian issue as one of refugees. The PLO and Palestinians generally wanted a state, not being left as refugees in other Arab lands. Terrorism was one means of delay negotiations that might leave the Palestinian issue without a political resolution.

WHAT WAS THE PLO POSITION REGARDING ISRAEL AND THE WEST BANK?

It changed. Initially, based on the 1968 Charter, the PLO called for the destruction of Israel by armed force. After the 1973 War, the PLO position gradually shifted toward seeking recognition of a two-state solution where the Palestinians would take land from which Israel withdrew, the West Bank and Gaza.

WHAT WAS THE UNITED STATESā POSITION?

It sought negotiations between Arab states and Israel, but supported Israelās total opposition to any Palestinian state or discussion with Palestinians.

WHAT CHANGED THE AMERICAN POSITION?

The Israeli hard-line policy, the ćIron Fist,ä toward Palestinian resistance in the West Bank led to the Palestinian uprising, the intifada, in December 1987. These events signaled ongoing Palestinian resistance to Israeli occupation in the West Bank and Gaza, during a period of intensified Israeli settlement activity aimed at keeping the land.

At the same time, Arab states had officially recognized the Palestiniansā right to a state and the right to negotiate for that state, backing Arafatās position. In 1988, this caused the United States to finally agree to open discussions with Arafat as PLO head on an official level.

DID THIS NEW APPROACH LEAD DIRECTLY TO THE 1993 OSLO ACCORD?

No. The Arab-Israeli negotiations following the Gulf War, the Madrid talks, led nowhere. As a result, a new Israeli government in 1992, led by Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, decided to approve secret talks in Oslo, Norway, with the Palestinian leadership. Rabin and Peres hoped to quell Palestinian violence led by Islamic groups, such as Hamas, which were popular because of ongoing settler activity and Israeli occupation. The secret Israeli-Palestinian talks in Oslo resulted in the first Oslo Accord in August-September 1993; The second, though not negotiated in Oslo, was reached in October-November 1995.

WHAT WAS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE?

1. On the Palestinian side, Yasser Arafat signed a letter recognizing the right of Israel to exist as a state. But, Yitzhak Rabin did not sign a letter recognizing the right of Palestinians to have a state ÷ he said he would negotiate with the PLO, which represented the Palestinian people. So many Palestinians were horrified that Arafat had recognized Israel without getting recognition in return.

2. On the Israeli side, followers of Rabin saw the agreement as a major victory. The concessions made to the Palestinians, such as Palestinian self-rule in the Gaza Strip and in Jericho on the West Bank, did not constitute a threat to Israelās security. But, Oslo I did contain plans for gradual Israeli withdrawals from other areas. This alarmed right-wing Israelis because it set a precedent for future withdrawals and the possibility of the loss of the settlements.

WHAT HAPPENED?

Implementation of Oslo I procedures was so slow that Arafat began to lose further face. This led to more terror bombings by Hamas and Islamic Jihad, inspired in part because settlement expansion continued. Rabin decided to enter into a much more extensive agreement, Oslo II, with the Palestinians. This means the Palestinians gradually would take over most of the areas of the West Bank populated by Arabs, with governing and security responsibilities; 70 percent of the West Bank, including the settlements, stayed in Israelās hands. Their status, along with Jerusalem, was left to ćfinal statusä talks, to begin within a five-year period. Right-wingers saw these concessions as leading to a Palestinian state and loss of settlements. Ultra-orthodox rabbis called for Rabinās assassination, which occurred in November 1995.

WHAT HAPPENED THEN?

Rabinās successor, Peres, lost upcoming elections to Binyamin Netanyahu of Likud who sought to delay if not derail the Oslo Accords. The situation deteriorated so much that the Clinton administration sought change, which appeared possible when Ehud Barak was elected to replace Netanyahu in spring 1999.

WHAT WERE BARAKāS GOALS?

He appears to have sought a peace agreement, but he feared assassination by right-wing settler groups. In addition, his coalition included parties opposed to his goals. Thus, when Barak sought talks with Arafat in July 2000 in desperation at Camp David, his coalition had collapsed because some parties opposed a peace that meant giving up any settlements.

WAS CAMP DAVID SIGNIFICANT?

Very, but not positively. Barak went further in offering peace terms than any Israeli leader had done, especially regarding Jerusalem, but he sought to retain settlements so that no viable Palestinian state emerged. The talks collapsed with Arafat being blamed, primarily because he did not explain the reasons for his disagreement.

WHAT RESULTED AFTERWARDS?

With Israeli politics destabilized, Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount in late September 2000 with 800 journalists to publicize Israeli control of the site against Barakās offers to the Palestinians. His appearance led to major Palestinian demonstrations; they were enraged in the aftermath of the failed Camp David talks and Arafatās failure to stop continued settlement activity. Initial Palestinian protests with stones met Israeli responses with live ammunition. Palestinians then replied with their own armed response and the conflict escalated to where it is today.

HOW COULD IT ESCALATE AS IT HAS?

1. The administration of President George W. Bush is much closer ideologically to that of former President Ronald Reaganās than to that of Former President George H.W. Bush. He, and his closest aides, are very sympathetic to Israel and right-wing politics generally. Therefore, the Bush administration took a ćhands-offä approach to the issue, to permit Sharon, now in office, to quell the uprising.

2. The Sept. 11 terrorist attacks on the United States created more sympathy in the Bush administration for Israeli defense against Palestinian attacks, many of which became increasingly terror suicide bombings against Israeli civilians.

IS ARAFAT AS RESPONSIBLE AS THE ADMINISTRATION AND ISRAEL CLAIM?

No. The uprising after Sharonās visit to the Temple Mount was spontaneous, as much a reflection of rage against Arafat as against Israel, particularly Arafatās inability to achieve a state and at the many rumors of corruption surrounding his rule. The violence of the Israeli reprisals also meant that any condemnation in the face of the confrontation might further discredit him. He can condemn terrorism but he cannot stop it.

WHY DOES BUSH DEMAND HE STOP IT?

Itās a way to simplify the situation for people in the Bush administration, especially the Pentagon, who are sympathetic to Likud expansionism in the West Bank and for Christian conservatives who back Bush and the Israeli takeover of the West Bank.

HOW DOES THE WORLD VIEW THE BUSH ADMINISTRATIONāS APPROACH?

We are almost completely isolated with Israel in a stance of open partisanship. The consensus outside the United States is that there must be a Palestinian state and that appearing to tolerate Sharonās methods is not the way to achieve it. Sharon just defied Bush and Bush called him a ćman of peace.ä

WHAT CAN WE EXPECT?

More violence, not only in the Middle East, but possibly directed against us because of our policies.